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THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. By Bernard Schwartz,* New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1965. Pp. 452. $12.50.
This is the third volume to be published of Professor Schwartz' pro-
jected five-volume "comprehensive commentary on the Constitution."
The first two volumes dealt with the federal system and the scope and
allocation of federal power. In this book, Professor Schwartz attempts
to set forth an authoritative doctrinal statement of the current status
of private property and private economic activity in the constitutional
scheme. Because it is not a book on the Supreme Court or on the
nature of constitutional adjudication, it does not speak in the language
of power, compliance, neutral principles or politics. Nor does it
attempt rigorously to deal with the social value of private property or
with problems of allocation of resources. Its premise is a simple one:
that there is a constitutional law of property which may be set forth
with clarity and precision. It is, in a word, a book of "law."
This is not to suggest that the book contains no personal views of its
author on what the law ought to be. Starting with the premises that
"it is the Due-Process Clause, more than any other organic provision,
that has maintained the 'just poize' between Authority and Liberty,"'
Professor Schwartz finds "disquieting elements in the swing of the
judicial pendulum from Adams v. Tanner to Ferguson v. Skrupa."-2
The swing to which he refers is, in a general way, the swing from a
view of due process which permitted the Court to substitute its own
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies to
one which bars the striking down of legislative acts (at least in the
sphere of economic regulation) unless hopelessly unreasonable. To
Professor Schwartz, the sustaining by the Court, in Kotch v. Pilot
Commissioners,3 of a Louisiana pilot-certification statute which had
the effect, though not the declared purpose, of creating a family
monopoly in the piloting business in New Orleans, was more an act
of "judicial abdication" than judicial self-restraint.
"The danger," according to Professor Schwartz, "is that, under the
present approach to questions of substantive due process-with the
property right always placed in the scale as an individual interest and,
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. ScvwARTz, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 27 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ScliwrTz].
2. SCHWARTZ 91. Compare Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (state law forbidding
collection of fees from employees by employment agencies held a denial of due process),
with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (state law forbidding non-lawyers to engage
in debt adjusting business held not a denial of due process).
3. 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
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as such, necessarily outweighed by the social interest in the opposite
side of the balance-the line between valid and invalid governmental
action is becoming increasingly blurred."4 If, of course, one takes the
view that statutes which the Court affirmatively sustains are, by defini-
tion, at least constitutionally "valid," if not wise or democratic, the
Schwartz objection becomes one that the line between valid and invalid
governmental action is becoming too sharp. Yet, if Professor Schwartz
is unhappy (perhaps only mildly so) with the Court's current prepared-
ness to sustain "invalid" (unconstitutional?) governmental action, he
is nonetheless aware of the fact that he is standing between the horns
of a dilemma; for in his discussion of Skrupa, he states, "to draw the
line between regulatory and prohibitory action is for the courts to
intrude into the realm of legislative value judgments and to make the
criterion of constitutionality what the judges believe to be for the
public good." 5
But why, in view of Professor Schwartz' expressed discontent with
the current relegation of substantive due process in the economic
regulation field to a mere check upon legislative irrationality, must
his book be called merely a book of "law"? One answer is that at no
point in the book do the author's views emerge as more than a tristful
wishing for something better. What that something better might be
is simply not disclosed. About the only proposal which he makes is
that the institution of private property be recognized as a "social
interest" and, hence, given more weight in cases involving property
rights.
If balance we must, should we not place on the individual's side
the importance of the institution of property in the free society?
The vindication of property rights themselves may, in other words,
be stated in terms of social interests. The society which has a
clear interest in furthering the general progress and the individ-
ual life also has an interest in securing property rights insofar
as they contribute to the advance of such interests.'
But who is the "we" who must do the balancing? Is it "we the people"
or "we the Supreme Court"? If it is to be the latter, as we may safely
assume is Professor Schwartz' choice, how is the balancing process to
go forward? Are there available objective criteria or trend information
by which the Supreme Court may determine when a legislature has
failed to give sufficient weight to the social interest in private property?
4. ScmvAr- 232.
5. Id. at 91.
6. Id. at 233.
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Are statutes to be read on their face, or are legislative motives to be-
come relevant? Is it Professor Schwartz' view that the Court is legiti-
mating "bad" legislation in cases where it could have avoided doing
so, or is it his view that the Court should affirmatively strike such
legislation down? If the latter, can Professor Schwartz point to the
constitutional principle which would justify such action? Professor
Schwartz does not attempt to answer these questions. In fact, he does
not even pose them. Because he does neither, his book makes no
serious contribution to discussion of what Professor Freund once
termed "the major issue of our time, how far economic community
is essential to human freedom."7
A second, and probably more important, reason why The Rights of
Property must be taken as a book of "law"-the term is by no means
intended pejoratively-is simply that the "law" is the chief object of
its focus. Some indication of the amount of law which the book at-
tempts to cover is revealed by its statistics. Of its 452 pages, 80 are
devoted to footnotes (2585 of them). The table of cited cases (of which
there are 1133) runs 29 pages, and the index 14. Page 438 is blank,
leaving, therefore, 328 pages for the main text or commentary. Thus,
the average number of footnotes and case citations for each page of
text is 7.9 and 3.5, respectively. Since Professor Schwartz tends to avoid
string citations, almost every case cited supports a separate statement
of law in the text. Measured, therefore, in dollops of law, the book is
about as comprehensive as anyone could ask.8
As a general survey of holdings in the areas of economic regulation
and eminent domain, the book is likely to be a valuable tool to prac-
ticing lawyer and law student. Unfortunately, much of the text dis-
cussion follows a style annoyingly similar to that of Corpus Juris
Secundum. Something of the flavor of this style is captured in this
fragment (complete with the author's footnote numbers) from pages
82-83:
That gambling is an evil which the law may rightfully stamp
out is no longer an open question.60 9 And this is true of all
forms of gambling-whether card 10 or dice playing, 611 wagering
on horse races, 12 lotteries,61 3 or more sophisticated forms such as
options to buy or sell commodities at a future time01 4 or the pur-
chase and sale of stocks on margin.01 5
7. FREUND, TIE SUPREME COURT OF rHE UNITED STATES 39 (1961).
8. Unless one asked for a discussion of the restrictive covenant cases (e.g., Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 [1948)), the sit-in cases (e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 [1964)), or
cases arising under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 [1964J), none of which are referred to in the text.
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Putting aside the objection that the first four citations are to state
court decisions, and putting aside the question whether trading in
commodities futures and margin sales are really merely sophisticated
forms of the "evil" of gambling, one must wonder why it was neces-
sary for Professor Schwartz to say more than that the prohibition of
gambling is clearly within the reach of a state's police power. Is this
comprehensiveness for comprehensiveness' sake, or does the author
seriously believe that the information he has provided will be useful?
One thing is dear: that by devoting a substantial part of his book
to what may be termed the trivially-true of constitutional law, Profes-
sor Schwartz has denied himself the opportunity of giving serious
attention to matters of substance. Thus, to the critically important
question of when noncompensable "regulation" under the police
power ends and compensable "taking" of private property begins-
a subject which was carefully, though by no means exhaustively,
explored in a 41-page article by Professor Joseph L. Sax in The Yale
Law Journal about a year ago9-Professor Schwartz is able to give only
three pages of text.10 With that little space to work in, it is not sur-
prising that the treatment is thin to the point of being elliptic. For
example, immediately following a two-paragraph discussion of Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead,"1 a 1962 Supreme Court decision which
sustained, as a noncompensable regulation under the police power,
a local ordinance which had the effect of preventing appellants from
continuing their previously lawful use of their property for mining
purposes, Professor Schwartz writes: "It is thus clear that government
may destroy or diminish values by assertion of the police power with-
out the necessity of making compensation for the loss." The word
"thus" would seem to imply that the statement is based upon the
immediately preceding discussion of Goldblatt, but that cannot be
true because the Court dearly stated in that case that "there is no
evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that
prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in
question." -2 If Professor Schwartz' statement is intended to mean no
more than that regulation under the police power which produces a
reduction in property value does not always (or even usually) require
payment of compensation, it is unobjectionable. But if it means that
9. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
10. SCRVARTZ 263-66.
11. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
12. Id. at 594.
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diminution of value produced by regulation can never constitute a
compensable taking, it is plainly wrong.
In the same three-page discussion, Professor Schwartz devotes a
paragraph to discussion of the so-called air-easement cases-United
States v. Causby'3 and Griggs v. Allegheny County.1 4 In both cases,
property was held to have been taken by reason of the low flight of
airplanes over it-military planes in Causby and private planes using
a government-owned airport in Griggs. Immediately following the text
discussion of these cases, appears the following sentence:
Yet, it is clear, under the discussion earlier in this section, that
if the owner's right to use such space above his land had been
eliminated by a reasonable regulation promulgated under the
police power (as by a zoning ordinance or an ordinance restricting
building heights), he would not be entitled to any compensation.' 6
Does Professor Schwartz mean that government may obtain air-ease-
ments without paying compensation by simply "regulating" them into
existence? It must be assumed he does not; for that view is simply
untenable. Yet, should a non-lawyer be expected to know that the
sentence cannot mean what it seems to mean?
The introduction of the non-lawyer into this review is quite perti-
nent, because there can be no doubt but that Professor Schwartz'
commentary is directed largely to him. In his opening preface to his
commentary, Professor Schwartz stated his "assumption that the work-
ing of the Constitution is more than the private preserve of the legal
profession." It was, he said, his "faith" that even the more difficult
subjects which his commentary would have to cover "need not be
obscured in the technical vacuum of legal language." They can, he
said, "be presented in a readable fashion and in a manner that makes
clear their significance to those interested in the operation of what
Gladstone once termed 'the most wonderful work ever struck off at
a given time by the brain and purpose of man.' "16
The Rights of Property is a hornbook on the constitutional law of
property. As hornbooks go, it seems a good one. But it must be doubted
that the "wonderful work" which is the Constitution will ever be
found within its covers.
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